Abstract. The paper proves by assertional means the correctness of a construction of Haldar and Subramanian of an atomic shared variable for one writer and one reader. This construction uses four unsafe variables and four safe boolean variables. Assignment to a safe but nonatomic variable is modelled as a repetition of random assignments concluded by an actual assignment. The proof obligation consists of four invariants. These are proved using 25 auxiliary invariants. The proof has been constructed and verified with the theorem prover NQTHM.
Introduction
In this note we discuss the construction of Haldar and Subramanian [HaS94] of an atomic shared variable for one writer and one reader by means of four unsafe variables together with four safe boolean variables. Haldar and Subramanian [HaS94] gave a correctness proof based on behavioural reasoning. It becomes more and more accepted that reliable reasoning about concurrent algorithms requires assertional reasong, i.e., reasoning on the level of individual states and single computation steps. The algorithm is a good case to show that assertional reasoning can be used for programs with variables that are not atomic but only safe or even unsafe.
In order to make sense of this, we have to introduce the concepts of safeness and atomicity of shared variables. We only consider variables that are written by a single process. Since processes themselves are sequential, it follows that different write operations to the same variable never overlap.
For every shared variable, we assume at least that every read operation that does not overlap with any write operation, returns the most recently written value. Following [Lam86] , a shared variable is called safe iff every read operation that overlaps with a write operation returns some legitimate value of the domain of the variable. A variable is called unsafe iff it is not safe. For an unsafe variable, a read operation is not allowed to overlap with write operations, since otherwise chaos may result.
A shared variable is atomic iff read and write operations behave as if they never overlap but always occur in some total order that refines the precedence order (an operation precedes another one iff it terminates before the other operation starts).
The program of [HaS94] that we treat here is a critical case since it uses no atomic shared variables, four unsafe data variables, and four safe control bits. It can be compared with Tromp's algorithm in [Tro89] , which needs eight safe bits, and which is a refinement of the version with four atomic bits. In [Hes98] , we gave an assertional proof of the version with four atomic bits. The safe bits complicate matters since, during the assignment to a safe bit, the bit can repeatedly change its value. When there are only four safe bits, one cannot preclude that a bit is inspected during an assignment.
One may notice that the paper [HaS94] makes the assumption that the data variables are safe. This is because they do not consider unsafe variables. They call the algorithm conflict-free to express that the assumption of safeness is superfluous.
In section 2 we present the formal model and the algorithm. In section 3, we briefly sketch the method developed in [Hes02a] to prove atomicity of read-write objects and we apply this method to obtain the assertional proof obligation, which in this case consists of four invariants. In section 4, we prove preservation of these invariants. We summarize our conclusions in section 5.
The formal model and the algorithm
We first describe the formal model. Since assertional reasoning depends on the states between atomic steps, we have to model the actions as atomic steps of some kind. By convention, shared variables are always assumed to be unsafe unless otherwise specified. They are written in typewriter font. Actions on private variables are considered atomic. Private variables are written in italics.
A read action of a shared variable x into a private variable v is denoted v : x. A write action of a private expression E into an unsafe shared variable x is written
It is regarded as an atomic step, but the programmer has the proof obligation that, whenever a process is about to execute command (0), no other process is about to read or write x as well. For a safe shared variable, we need to indicate that reading during a write action may return any value. We therefore denote a write action of a private expression E into a safe shared variable x by (flickering) x : E .
(1)
We model this in relational semantics, such as TLA [Lam94] , by specifying that command (1) has the relational meaning
Here, the primes are used for the values of the variables after the step, pc stands for the location pointer, and by convention all shared or private variables apart from pc and x are unchanged. In other words, command (1) is modelled as a repetition of arbitrary assignments to x that ends with the actual assignment of E to x. The value of x is indeterminate during the repetition. Liveness conditions are used to ensure that the repetition terminates. Recall that there is only one writer and one reader. The writer writes to buf, ww and c. The reader writes to rr. We represent the algorithm by means of two procedures Write and Read. The writing procedure writes to one of the four buffers and then inspects variable rr to get an estimate where the reader is reading. If the reader is reading a recent buffer, the writer writes again to a fresh one, see [HaS94] . For a bit b, we use ¬b to denote 1 − b. We have numbered the atomic steps for future reference. The numbers start at 20 to ease their use in our mechanical theorem prover. The grain of atomicity is such that every atomic step contains only one essential reference to a shared variable. The proviso "essential" is added, since the writer reads in steps 20 and 23 its own output variable c. This reading can easily be eliminated by introducing a private copy of c.
proc
Proof obligations
Inspired by [Lyn96] , we developed in [Hes02a] an assertional theory for atomicity of read-write objects, i.e., atomic shared variables. Theorem CRIT of [Hes02a] serves to prove atomicity. We shall apply it to the above protocol. We thus provide both processes with private integer ghost variables start and sqn. A shared integer ghost variable masq serves to denote the maximal sqn value of the completed operations. Initially masq t 0 for some number t 0 . Every process updates masq at the end of every operation by masq : max(sqn, masq) .
In every operation of a process, it updates its private variables start and sqn precisely once as described now.
Every operation of a process starts by copying the current value of masq to start. During every write operation, the writer increments sqn and attaches its new value of sqn as a kind of time stamp to the value to be written. When reading, the reader copies this attached number to sqn. The initial value v 0 of the abstract variable has the initial tag t 0 .
According to theorem CRIT of [Hes02a] , atomicity of the protocol is proved when we have the invariants that every write action has the postcondition start < sqn for the writer and that every read action has the postcondition start sqn for the reader.
We therefore augment the procedures with the actions on the ghost variables. For convenience in the invariants, we replace the repeated procedure calls by an infinite loop for the writer and an infinite loop for the reader and we extend the lifetimes of the local variables of the procedures by replacing them with private variables of the processes such that initially aw 0 and br 1. The tags attached to the values are represented by a separate array tag, which is a ghost variable where initially tag[0, 0] t 0 . In this way, the code for the writer becomes: We let q and r stand for the pc values of the writer and the reader, respectively.
Safeness of the assignments to the unsafe variable buf requires that whenever the writer is about to write buf[i, j] and the reader is about to read buf[m, n], then (i, j) (m, n). This is expressed in the two invariants
In order to distinguish the private ghost variables start and sqn of writer and reader, we write startw and sqnw for the values at the writer and startr and sqnr for the values at the reader. As indicated above, the proof obligations for atomicity are the invariants
Stricly speaking, the inequality of (Jq0) is required only when q 27, but it is easier to prove the stronger invariant (Jq0). For simplicity, we use t 0 1 and assume that tag[i, j] 1 for all i, j, and sqnw 1 and startw sqnr 0 initially.
Verification
We thus have to verify that our concurrent program with 13 atomic statements satisfies the invariants (Iq0), (Iq1), (Jq0), (Jq1). We use the method described in [Hes02a] Section 3.3. The program is verified using two events files [Hes02b] for the theorem prover NQTHM of [BoM88] . The file concprelude defines the semantics for shared variable concurrency. The file regvarHS contains the program, the development of the invariants, and their initialization. We now proceed with a fairly detailed account of the proof. Since the shared variables ww and rr are only safe variables, we avoid them as much as possible in the invariants and use their local copies aw and br instead, based on the following two invariants:
Preservation of (Kq0) and (Kq1) is easy. They hold initially because of the initialization chosen. Since the assignments at 41 and 26 are flickering, nothing can be said about the value of rr at 41 or the value of ww at 26. In order to prove (Iq0), we generalize it to
This invariant is threatened only when q 22 or q 25, in which cases its preservation follows from (Kq0). Preservation of (Iq1) is threatened only when q 22, in which case its preservation follows also from (Kq0).
In order to prove (Jq0), we postulate that sqnw is always the largest number around, as expressed in the invariants
In (Kq4), the variables i and j are free and range over Bit. The invariant (Jq0) is threatened only when q 20. It is preserved at 20 because of (Kq2). We need (Kq3) to prove preservation of (Kq2) when r 44, and (Kq4) to prove preservation of (Kq3) when r 43. The remaining verifications are easy. For example, all three predicates hold initially. This concludes the treatment of the first three proof obligations.
The last proof obligation
The proof of invariance of (Jq1) is complicated. We provide it for the sake of completeness and illustration. Since we only want to consider invariants of a relatively simple form, the proof of (Jq1) turns out to need twenty auxiliary invariants. We first settle a number of auxiliary invariants. Since masq never decreases and startr is only set equal to masq, we obviously have the invariant:
Since tag, c, sqnw, are modified by the writer almost without interaction with the reader, there are some relatively easy invariants which express sqnw in terms of tag.
The invariant (Lq1) is preserved at 21 and 25 because of (Lq2) and (Lq4). Predicate (Lq3) is preserved at 20 because of (Lq1). Predicate (Lq4) is preserved at 24 because of (Lq5). The rather surprising preservation of (Lq4) at 25 is due to (Lq1). Note that the mutual dependence of (Lq1) and (Lq4) does not introduce circular reasoning: all invariants are postulated in the preconditions of all steps, and we then prove that they hold in the postconditions. Predicate (Jq1) only contains private variables of the reader. The writer therefore preserves (Jq1). Since the reader can reach r 44 from 40 and 43, predicate (Jq1) is threatened at 40 and 43. For preservation of (Jq1) at 43, it is necessary and sufficient to postulate the invariant (Sq0) r 43 ⇒ startr tag[br, cr] .
In the remainder of this text, we only give the remaining invariants and why we need them, but we omit the arguments to show that they are sufficient. The reader interested in the details and willing to read lisp-like code is referred to [Hes02b] .
We postpone the treatment of (Jq1) and first settle (Sq0). For this purpose, we introduce the following invariants concerning startr. Predicate (Sq1) is introduced to preserve (Sq0) at 42. Similarly, (Sq2) is introduced for (Sq1) at 24 and (Sq3) for (Sq2) at 23. Preservation of (Sq3) at 22 is worth mentioning. Because of the test in 22 and invariant (Kq0), the writer only arrives at 23 with aw br when the reader is at 41. Therefore (Sq3) is preserved because of (Sq1).
